



Company Operations During the Establish

by Captain Roger Maynulet

"Units may have to conduct operations in environments that do not involve traditional combat. A unit may also be utilized in a stability or support operation at the successful conclusion of a combat mission. While stability and support operations can occur anywhere, they will most likely occur in an urban environment. During a stability operation or support operation, units perform many activities not necessarily contained in its mission essential task list."¹

In May 2003, 1st Brigade, 1st Armored Division arrived in Baghdad as peace operations began replacing the high-intensity conflict operations of the 3d Infantry Division and U.S. Marines. Until the majority of the units were physically within the city limits, commanders were unsure of the task organization their units would assume and of the sectors in Baghdad they would control. This article outlines some essential tasks and lessons learned from one armor company's assumption of mission in Baghdad, Iraq. These essential tasks include task organization, relief in place, forward operating base recon and establishment, command post operations, and establishing the neighborhood advisory council (NAC).

The 2d Battalion, 37th (2-37) Armor Regiment arrived in Baghdad and began conducting relief in place and simultaneously establishing systems. Leaders at the company level and below began operations by assuming the mission and commander's intent of the force in place, which allowed the battalion staff to get their feet on the ground and become familiar with operations prior to tasking units.

Predeployment

A Company, 2-37 (A/2-37) Armor's train-up at home station consisted of level one gunnery, company and platoon situational training exercise (STX) lanes, and a combat training center live fire. During deployment preparation, the company also conducted focused military operations in urban terrain (MOUT) and stability operations and support operations training, to include checkpoint operations, cordon and search, react to ambush, and many other tasks the company was likely to encounter.

The situation in Iraq continued to develop during the training and deployment process; therefore, leaders could not focus on any particular sector, specific mission, or task organization. Focusing on soldier-level tasks allowed flexibility in the training schedule during a time when conflicting requirements were common.



ment of Stability Operations in Baghdad

The company was deploying from the cool temperate climate of Central Europe to the oppressive heat of the Kuwaiti and Iraqi deserts. Increased water intake prior to deployment, ensuring soldiers are eating three meals a day despite a decreased appetite, and constant supervision by leaders will lower the likelihood of heat casualties.

During the staging period in Camp Udairi Kuwait, the most useful and motivational training for the soldiers was the short-range marksmanship (SRM) training that is operated by contractors. These experts (former special operations noncommissioned officers) led the tankers through the basics of SRM in the wide-expanse of the Kuwaiti firing ranges. The ability to shoot the M4 or M16 accurately while standing, advancing, and side-stepping laterally, as well as inside buildings, is critical during enemy confrontation. Most company firefights were less than 150 meters.

While still in Kuwait, company and battalion commanders benefited from eavesdropping on the division and corps battle update briefs. Listening to the kinds of engagements, hotspots, and other issues concerning operations in Baghdad allowed commanders to become familiar with the operational environment and begin building a broad plan on how to execute missions in that environment.

Task Organization

The task organization for the company (and the battalion) was uncertain until arriving in Baghdad. Once they arrived in Baghdad, 2-37 Armor was cross-attached to the 2d Light Cavalry Regiment (2LCR) to provide heavy armor assets to the high mobility, multipurpose wheeled vehicles (HMMWV) of the LCR. The 2-37 Armor cross-attached one tank company to 1st Squadron, 2LCR while the battalion received one troop from the same squadron. The task force commander attached one scout platoon to A/2-37 Armor from his new cavalry troop and provided the troop with one platoon of tanks.

The tank company commander's effective employment of this scout platoon hinged on several factors and can best be determined using mission, enemy, terrain, troops, and time available (METT-T). The company's mission on arriving in May was to conduct combat operations in a sector of Baghdad and provide security and stability to allow reconstruction efforts to begin (mission statements must change depending on the operational environment just as in high-intensity conflict operations).

The enemy consisted of Baathists, former regime loyalists, and common criminals attempting to undermine coalition forces' authority through guerrilla attacks, using the local population as

its camouflage. The terrain on which the company would be conducting its mission is built-up urban terrain with a mix of residential streets in linear and rectangular pattern, highways, and a limited number of neighborhoods with “rayed” streets.² Trafficability depended on location, but also on time of day. Civilian traffic cycles need to be considered (although not exclusively) for determining whether tanks or wheels will roll on a mission. Building size varied from one-floor shack houses, two-story mansions, and multilevel apartment and office buildings. Troops available were one headquarters section, two tank platoons, and one scout platoon with eight M1026s. The medic (red-cross covered) and maintenance M113s were also sliced to the platoons to provide flexibility to transport raid teams or evacuate wounded personnel. Time available for the mission is one year or until mission complete.

To provide each subordinate maneuver element the flexibility to conduct the varied missions required for combat and support operations and stability operations, the scout platoon was broken down by section and cross-attached to each of the remaining two tank platoons and the headquarters tank section (the



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scout platoon leader and platoon sergeant controlled two remaining scout sections and the headquarters tank crews). This task organization provided each platoon with the ability to conduct the full spectrum of operations, to include zone recons (formerly known as presence patrols), raids, and other activities related to light operations. It also allowed each platoon to conduct missions, such as fixed checkpoints, fixed-site security, zone recons (during hours of light traffic), quick reaction forces (QRF) for raids, cordon missions, and other activities, with the heavy armor of the M1A1 Abrams main battle tank. During the occasional task force-level operations, the task organization was adjusted to give the scouts more consolidated manpower for raids and building clearing, and allow the tankers to concentrate on outer-cordon security.

Cross training 19Ds and 19Ks on each other’s respective tasks improved the company’s ability to accomplish missions with this unique task organization. HMMWV driver’s training was an ongoing event and curfew hours were a perfect time to train new soldiers on driving in realistic terrain. Select scouts could also

conduct tank crew gunnery skills training to be qualified on tank weapons systems. Eventually, the line between scout and tanker within the company blurred because everyone executed similar missions. The scout platoon’s integration was a welcome event and a pure tank company could not have been as successful without the scout platoon’s skills, experience, and leadership. This task organization also allowed for an easier rotation of red, amber, and green cycles during the yearlong mission. Rotating these duties is an excellent way to mitigate complacency by varying the soldiers’ mission and tasks.

Relief In Place

Relief in place is an essential task of assuming any long-term mission in the stability operations and support operations environments. The time frame of the relief in place varies depending on mission requirements. The relief in place is a leader-intensive mission that needs to have a clear focus culminating in a commander’s assessment. A/2-37 Armor’s tasks included:

- Fully immersing into the outgoing company’s everyday operations, focusing on getting every soldier into sector with his counterpart.
- Platoon leaders and company commanders meeting with community leaders in sector.
- Assessing the status of all elements of the sector’s infrastructure, to include electricity, water, police, schools, hospitals, and demographics.
- Providing the task force commander with a comprehensive commander’s assessment and recommended plan of action to meet the higher command’s intent.
- To relieve the 3d Infantry Division outgoing company as quickly as possible to allow them to reconsolidate, refit, and prepare for redeployment.

Most leaders are familiar with the basic concept and intent of the relief in place from missions in Bosnia and Kosovo. Leaders must ensure everyone is comfortable with the tasks they will be required to accomplish for the next several months. The earlier the commander can arrange patrols into sector and get soldiers immersed in the operational environment, the more confident they will be when the training wheels come off and transfer of authority is complete. Task force staff and leaders will most likely not supervise the relief in place closely because they will be busy learning their jobs and becoming familiar with the multiple sectors under task force control. Company leaders must provide clear guidance and initiative for a successful relief in place.

Company leaders will be required to meet with community leaders and influential Iraqis in sector to minimize confusion among the populace by identifying the responsible authority in sector and establish close relationships necessary for stability operations and support operations. Visits to all pertinent centers of gravity in the sector will familiarize leaders with these areas and help build the template for future patrols and humanitarian projects. Political party headquarters, community leaders, and tribal leaders all have influence in sector and can serve as force multipliers when conducting operations by spreading information on coalition projects and positive propaganda. Community leaders legitimize their positions and increase their clout by being seen with coalition forces and participating in reconstruction projects.

Properly assessing the state of the infrastructure in sector is obviously key to reconstruction efforts and building the local populace’s trust. The residents of the sector will expect miraculous speed in re-establishing electricity, sewage, water treatment, and

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security. At first glance, the commander will believe that he cannot influence city-level issues such as power and water. In reality, some problems were fixed by replacing common generator parts or wire, or by the coalition simply supervising the station's management at the local site. The residents can provide some insight into the state of basic utilities, although nothing can replace a visit to the actual power substation, sewage department, or water-pumping facility. Producing electricity may be a theater-level problem solved at higher echelons, but local commanders can improve distribution of available electricity, garbage trucks, and clean water. Assessing the competence of city workers and agencies is also vital to improving services since many workers were employed by the former regime based solely on party affiliation and not technical expertise.

Forward Operating Base Establishment and Life Support

Mission requirements may require the company to establish a forward operating base (FOB) away from the task force headquarters. U.S. Army Field Manual 3-06.11, *Combined Arms Operations In Urban Terrain*, provides an excellent list of planning factors and work priorities for establishing a company FOB.³ When deciding whether to establish an FOB, the following issues were considered:

- The company's sector was located away from the task force headquarters along a main supply route.
- The proposed FOB site was already manned (but not developed) by the outgoing company in charge of the sector and was tied in to the perimeter of another brigade's FOB.
- The proximity to the company's sector allowed informants, community leaders, and police access (after the required security search) to meet with company leaders and discuss issues concerning crime and reconstruction.
- The pre-existing buildings located within the FOB allowed soldiers improved quality of living and a measure of comfort conducive to a long-term mission.

Establishing the FOB and the relief in place should occur simultaneously. The first sergeant and the company commander should do a joint reconnaissance and assessment of the viability of the site. The first sergeant can provide a realistic expectation of the site's potential for improvement and can direct work priorities while the commander concentrates on relief in place and familiarization of the sector. The first sergeant also decides where each platoon will live and how many soldiers can safely occupy each room since not all the room sizes are the same. Sep-



arating sleeping areas for noncommissioned officers (NCOs), officers, and soldiers must be considered if space is available. A little privacy and time away from the platoon sergeant and platoon leader is important to a soldier enduring a yearlong deployment and is vital to maintaining a healthy command climate and good morale. This, of course, does not excuse leaders from conducting regular health and welfare inspections and regularly supervising soldiers' living areas.

Establishing observation points and direct-fire planning can be conducted exactly as in a high-intensity conflict environment, with particular attention to fighting-position construction, wire communications, wire obstacle emplacement, barriers to protect from drive-by shootings, and lighting. Observation posts (OPs) were used to cover the portion of the perimeter the company manned. The OPs used wire and FM communications to cross talk and communicate with the command post. The commander of the relief used a Motorola radio to communicate with the OPs and the command post (CP) without having to stay at the CP. An FOB defense plan was also devised, which required increased manning at the OPs, and a wheeled and armored QRF to counterattack enemy forces or provide medical assistance and security to casualties outside the perimeter. Using an M1A1 tank at an OP is not only an advantage for its thermal capabilities, multiple weapons capability, and excellent armor, but also a psychological deterrent to would-be attackers. The Iraqis still respect the capabilities (true and exaggerated) of the Abrams, and placing a tank section on a perimeter or near a soft target greatly reduces the possibility of an attack. Each OP must have the basic equipment required by doctrine to be effective such as maps, sector sketches, fire plans, and binoculars.



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Coolers and overhead shade are also required during the summer months.

The company's battle rhythm will also be an important aspect of conducting sustained operations that will last up to a year. The task organization was adjusted to allow for three platoons to rotate red-, amber-, and green-cycle duties. The red platoon was responsible for force protection duties, dining facility/day room cleaning, serving during meals, logistics and commander escort duty, and improvement projects inside the FOB. The amber platoon was in charge of fixed-site security at remote locations, and last minute, directed missions from higher command. The green platoon focused exclusively on patrols and projects in sector. The rotations for these cycles were 1-week intervals. A week is the perfect balance between having a constant state of change and becoming stagnant and risking complacency. Guard duty and other red duties are essential tasks, but unless properly rotated into other duties, soldiers can easily become bored and careless. A weekly change of pace and operational tempo is enough to keep the company mentally alert and proficient in all company operations.

Field sanitation standards must be enforced rigorously to maintain health. The lack of working latrines, limited sources of potable water, and a preponderance of flies and other parasites can render a company combat ineffective if company leaders do not enforce hygiene discipline. One platoon took the initiative and built a burn toilet, shower (nonpotable), and washbasins out of pre-existing materials. All of the platoons cleaned up the area with the help of local hires (using funds provided by the battalion). Each element of the field sanitation kit was used in this environment — mousetraps, bug repellent, flypaper, mesh screening, lime, and bleach was consumed very quickly, so purchase a surplus of these items.

After establishing security, company battle rhythm, and addressing field sanitation issues, leaders prioritized other projects for improving the company FOB:

- Establishing the company command post inside an existing structure.
- Repairing the looted and damaged electrical system.
- Obtaining air conditioning for sleeping areas.
- Furnishing another existing building as the company dining facility/day room.

Repairing the electrical system was a joint effort between locally hired electricians (some with questionable technical skills) and a member of the company who happened to be a former generator mechanic and licensed electrician. Overhauling the wiring and circuit breakers was necessary to manage the load produced by the air conditioners. The battalion's purchase of a 100-kilowatt generator provided the company with enough power to run the air conditioners and power the FOB when the city's power grid was down.

A separate structure for the dining facility and the day room allowed soldiers to eat their meals away from their sleeping areas (minimizing vermin and parasites in the rooms) and provided company leaders a separate place to inspect soldiers and equipment. On entering the dining facility for a meal, an NCO would stand at the door and observe weapons clearing procedures and cleanliness. The communal setting of the dining facility allowed for more interaction among leaders and soldiers and also provided a family dinner time atmosphere that increased in importance during the holidays or special events such as birthdays or promotions.

Other contracts secured for improving the company FOB included overhead shade for the HMMWV line (the heat caused a fail-5 message on the radios), repairing drainage and sewage lines to minimize standing water, and an internet cafe for soldiers. The company FOB did not fall into the division plan for internet kiosks, and the soldiers had limited access to morale phones and e-mail. A local national working as an interpreter had extensive computer and network knowledge and set up a cluster of five computers and a satellite internet connection in the day room. After signing the division's computer-use agreement concerning restrictions and operations security measures, the soldiers used the computers for e-mail and internet calls for a low hourly fee. Adding internet kiosks was the single largest morale event for soldiers. Soldiers could now stay in touch with their families, stay updated on world events, and conduct video teleconferences with their loved ones almost daily.

The division did provide Armed Forces Network decoders and televisions just in time for football season. Commanders should assess what higher headquarters will realistically provide versus what will be resourced at their level. Internet access at the company level was a very simple and inexpensive process whereby the provider fronted the costs for all the equipment, to in-

clude surge protectors and fans to protect the computers. Usage was the only cost to soldiers and they were more than willing to spend a couple of dollars to talk to or e-mail family and friends.

Establishing and improving the company FOB is essential to a successful long-term deployment. Occupying and improving existing buildings is much easier, cheaper, and less resource-intensive than creating buildings from nothing. Soldiers can survive in any environment and will accomplish their mission while enduring a very low standard of living as shown in recent media reports. During a deployment that is going to last several months to a year, commanders will improve the morale and effectiveness of their soldiers if they can give them a comfortable place to rest, conduct maintenance, and train. Existing structures will also improve the effectiveness of a company CP and planning cell by keeping documents, tools, maps, and equipment protected from the elements.

Command Post Operations

Rapidly establishing a working company CP is crucial to stability operations and support operations in Baghdad. The company CP will bear many similarities to a CP used in a high-intensity conflict environment, but the information and tracking requirements will be much greater for a company CP in an FOB. Essential tasks to complete during the establishment of the company CP include FM communications, properly labelling all maps and battle tracking tools, a board for the information officer and civil affairs-related projects, and a method for recording end of mission reports.

The company will need a minimum of three secure nets running at any one time. To include all elements of the CP in one room, we removed the radios from the first sergeant's M113 and placed them in a large ground-floor room in one of the buildings in the FOB. The M113 stayed right outside the CP room to provide power for the radios. This required the CP NCO in charge (NCOIC)/officer in charge (OIC) to start the M113 every two hours to keep the batteries charged. The nets used were the battalion command, company command, and force protection nets used by the entire perimeter, to include adjacent units and gate guards. The force protection net was necessary in the event that a local national visitor (council member, informant, or interpreter) was present at the gate and needed an escort to the company area. The CP also had a Motorola radio as a secondary method of communication. Two OE-254s were placed on the roof of the CP building to maximize the range for communications with battalion and the majority of downtown Baghdad for patrols in or out of sector on the company net. Baghdad has very few buildings over three stories tall and raising the base of the OE-254 to a height of 15 feet provided excellent range, out to 20 kilometers in most instances (with working power amplifiers).

As in any combat environment, proper battle tracking, situational awareness, and command and control are key to any successful military operation. The first and most important element of a successful CP is the capabilities of the soldier behind the radio. During operations in Baghdad, at a minimum, one NCO or officer was always on duty in the CP. Too many units put young privates and specialists on radio watch/CP duty, who do not have the experience, authority, or confidence to make maneuver decisions or answer complex questions to higher units about operations in sector. At any given time, there may be four or five maneuver elements in sector and the commander and first sergeant may be in a council meeting, or unable to communicate with all the elements on the ground. The CP NCOIC/OIC will provide accurate reports to battalion, accurately track all el-

ements in sector (during a crisis event like the UN bombing this will include multiple battalions, civilian agencies, news media, and VIPs), coordinate link-up points, and alert QRF personnel. The company executive officer will take over CP duties during task force operations or mass casualty events to provide accurate assessments to the task force while the commander develops the situation on the ground and often away from the task force net.

The best map product for conducting sector operations in Baghdad is the satellite imagery (1:5,000-scale with gridlines) provided for each sector. This map was mounted in the CP and streets were labelled using white strips of paper taped to the acetate. Churches, mosques, hospitals, political party headquarters, banks, and other key facilities were also labelled. A series of checkpoints were included and a patrol went out into sector to get 10-digit grids for all the checkpoints in sector (easily identifiable intersections and squares). A list of these checkpoints and grids were given to battalion so they could assemble common graphics for the battalion and use the checkpoint system when referring to areas or points in sector. Another map useful for finding important areas across Baghdad was the tourist map the company ordered through Amazon.com. This map labelled many key facilities, hotels, and monuments, and was helpful in navigating the streets of Baghdad, especially when patrols were required to link-up outside of the assigned company sector. Baghdad's neighborhoods are broken down into sections known as "mahallas." A three-digit number similar to an area code identifies these mahallas. The locals use this numbering system often when describing events in certain areas. Because of this, labelling the map with each of the mahallas is very important. The 1st Armored Division's terrain team was also helpful in providing special maps covering specific areas in sector.

The popularity of the satellite imagery cannot be overstated. The imagery provided resolution that allowed leaders to plan raids and cordons for individual houses, and its large size allowed for easy battle tracking. Properly labelling the map also allows for quick identification of key sites and familiarization with the sector.

Several large dry-erase boards are also important for battle tracking in the CP. The company tracks each patrol and every section of troops on fixed-site security. Key information, such as number of troops/vehicles, bumper numbers, route, purpose,



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and OIC/NCOIC, are tracked on the patrol board. This information is forwarded to battalion and updates on the patrol's location are tracked on the satellite imagery board with an adhesive sticker. Another dry-erase board is used for tracking significant events in or out of sector — our "bolo" list that contains suspicious vehicles or people to watch, and significant route closings due to improvised explosive devices (IEDs).

As the number of IED attacks increased in July 2003, the company started tracking IED trends by marking the locations of IED attacks on a 1:50,000 Baghdad special map. This allowed leaders to conduct intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) and route planning prior to executing a mission. Main supply routes were exclusively targeted and therefore avoided whenever possible. Overpasses were also popular with terrorists for IED and grenade attacks.

The company fire support officer served as the information officer or targeting officer. This role was possibly one of the most demanding in the company. He accompanied the commander to all neighborhood council meetings, tracked all reconstruction projects in sector, and wrote proposals for future projects. Some projects proposed by the company may cost more than \$60,000 and include nongovernment organizations and government contractors, and require constant supervision of Iraqi subcontractors at work sites. The information officer's position is important because he is the buffer between the commander and the influential (and less-than-influential) personnel in sector. If the company commander met with everyone who wanted help or needed something, that would be his only mission. Therefore, the information officer needs to have a special place in the CP to present his information so patrols can identify key locations and projects in sector.

The information officer should display photographs of influential people in sector with a brief biography. This includes neighborhood action council members, political party leaders, police chiefs, and religious leaders. Having the photographs posted in the CP allows patrols to become familiar with these individuals and meet with them regularly during patrols to form good relationships. A similar collection of pictures can be formed of criminals or suspicious personnel in sector who are known to be trouble. The same system must be used for buildings in sector. Pictures of key facilities and buildings are important for the first few weeks so patrols can easily identify the buildings in

sector. Police stations, political party headquarters, hospitals, clinics, and key religious sites should form the majority of these photos. The information officer will also have various psychological operations and civil affairs pamphlets and handouts so patrols can grab a stack and hand them out while on patrol.

A patrol completes its mission with an end of mission report. These reports should include detailed information on the route, mission, significant events, and a small narrative about the patrol. The patrol leader completes the report and the commander reviews it before sending his daily commander's update.

An organized CP with the adequate tools and products will ease the burden on leaders to continuously pull information from stacks of daily staff journals (DA Form 1594) and allow the company to focus on its mission. Good standard operating procedures and leaders engaged in CP operations are crucial when routine patrols become crisis events such as the UN compound bombing and other mass-casualty events.

The Neighborhood Advisory Council

The neighborhood advisory council (NAC) is the primary link between the military and the local population. These NACs are elected officials who work in each mahalla and represent local residents. Although these NACs were elected, the sector commander has every right to dismiss a representative or appoint a new one, depending on performance, attitude, and willingness to serve the community. A company commander in charge of a sector can be supervising up to three NACs, depending on the size of his sector. The first meetings with the NACs could be described as chaotic, unproductive, and frustrating. The confusion stems from both parties (U.S. forces and council members) not really understanding the NAC's purpose. Some thought it was a neighborhood watch program or an informant network; some believed it was a steppingstone to joining the city council. The fact is, the NACs reflected the will of what the commander on the ground believed the neighborhood needed.

A/2-37 Armor was responsible for two NACs. The first few NAC meetings were huge gatherings of people lining up to ask for help from coalition forces and complain about the lack of security, utilities, and jobs. The NACs had to be taught how to run an effective meeting. They were also taught how to present their problems. The best teaching model to use to train the NACs



An Iraqi Civil Defense Course instructor teaches an Iraqi recruit room clearing techniques during urban warfare training.

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how to function is the military decisionmaking process (MDMP). The MDMP is just a model based on problemsolving techniques. It teaches people how to approach a problem and decide the best course of action to solve the issue. After a short class on the MDMP, the meetings became much more effective. The meetings went from, "we don't have any electricity, please fix it" to "we don't have any electricity in mahalla 706 due to a circuit box that has been damaged. We need a new circuit box that will cost \$200." Addressing the problems in this manner gives the commander a quantifiable problem and the information necessary to solve the problem. It also empowers the council to find civil engineers, electricians, plumbers, and phone technicians needed to diagnose real problems.

It took several weeks for us to determine how to best solve these problems once they were reasonably presented. The chairman of each NAC would present their individual issues. After all the issues and possible solutions were presented, the commander allotted assets to each problem. Many utility issues were solved with a visit to the power substation, water pumping plant, or sewage treatment facility. Many workers in those plants were unwilling to leave their offices to actually repair neglected utilities. A U.S. Army patrol with heavily armed soldiers entering a sewage treatment facility is usually enough motivation to persuade workers to get in a truck and go repair a problem. The patrol leader may have to threaten the foreman with his job if he is unwilling to help, but mostly all they want is an escort to the site. It became common practice to assign patrols to a weekly "utilities recon" and visit all the power substations, water plants, telecommunications sites, and other city functions to ensure good working relationships and update supervisors on problems in the neighborhood that need addressing.

Once battalion commanders had access to discretionary funds to work on projects, the information officer would write proposals for projects in sector nominated by the NAC. The NAC was required to provide three estimates from three different contractors. Detailed receipts and a scope of work were also required. The information officer would then write a proposal, including digital photographs of the site. The battalion commander would approve or disapprove projects, and as soon as the money was available, the information officer would tell the contractor to start work (some more expensive projects were forwarded to nongovernment organizations who occasionally attended NAC meetings). This system worked much faster than expected, and once the NAC understood the process, they had a true purpose: identify where the neighborhood needs reconstruction, provide fair and reasonable estimates from local contractors, and supervise the project. This gave each individual member a pet project, in which they took great pride. Large projects, such as soccer fields and road repair, would be given an opening ceremony and advertised throughout the neighborhood as a joint coalition and NAC project.

Projects completed in sector within a given month included: two road repair projects totalling \$90,000; two \$7,000 soccer fields; a \$4,000 sewage project, with new pipes installed to improve drainage; a new \$300 circuit switch at the telephone station; and an \$800 generator to provide power to the community swimming pool filter system. Other projects, such as trash bins for the entire neighborhood, a construction project to replace the run-down market stands with permanent kiosks, and more road repairs, have also been completed.

Giving due credit to the NACs for their hard work and ensuring these accomplishments are passed on to the local media is crucial to establishing the trust between the NACs and the neighborhoods. One NAC member should be designated as the

media representative who can invite local journalists to attend the opening ceremonies of certain projects.

In time, a good NAC will present their projects at the weekly meeting, brief what they have accomplished on their own, and present any issues that specifically need solving through military or police channels. The commander of the sector should be there to provide guidance, reassurance, and answer any questions NACs might have. The information officer will be there to provide updates on funding for future projects, collect feedback on the projects in sector, and coordinate any further meetings throughout the week.

The Next Step

Since August 2003, the company has placed more emphasis on reconstruction-oriented patrols, as opposed to security patrols. The Iraqi police force has become a mobile, professional force with radio communications. The reaction time for the police has increased ten-fold due to effective training and improved patrol techniques. U.S. forces trained the Iraqi Civil Defense Corps (ICDC) and implemented them into daily patrols, which has made enormous positive impacts on Iraqi life. Dismounted patrols of U.S. forces and ICDC personnel were literally applauded by locals as they patrolled. As ICDC personnel gain confidence and experience, they will take over more patrolling duties in sector and put more of an Iraqi face to reconstruction efforts.

Terrorist attacks remain a threat and targeting former regime loyalists and foreign-based terrorists must continue. However, if reconstruction efforts are ignored, local residents will become more frustrated with coalition forces. Company commanders and platoon leaders will need to conduct more direct coordination with nongovernment organizations and the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) to focus on infrastructure projects in every sector of Baghdad. Escorting civil engineers to inspect school reconstruction projects, bringing CPA personnel into sector to evaluate water-pumping and power stations, and supporting the local government in sector through an aggressive information operations campaign are just some examples of the missions that are making the biggest impact. Every sector in Baghdad is different, and commanders need to make judgments based on security, demographics, and available assets. Commanders will not find instructions on how to pacify their sector in a field manual or mission training plan. They need to think creatively, be flexible, and empower their subordinates.



Notes

¹U.S. Army Field Manual 3-06.11, *Combined Arms Operations in Urban Terrain*, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 28 February 2002, Chapter 14: Stability Operations and Support Operations, p. 14-1.

²Ibid., p. 2-9.

³Ibid., p. 14-4.

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